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The private sector has been playing an increasingly important role in China's national 
economy. Before 1985, the share of private sector industrial output in the national total
was negligible, although its share of employment was already around 2 per cent of the 
national non-agricultural labor force in 1981. In 1985, its share of industrial output 
reached nearly 2 per cent of the national total. By 1993, that figure climbed o 8 p r 
cent. In 1997, it reached 18 per cent. In value terms, private sector industrial output 
has experienced an exponential growth in the last 20 years to reach 2,171 billion yuan 
in 1995 at constant prices. Its share in industrial employment had already re ched 18 
per cent of the national total by 1995. The expansion of employment experienced a 
major downturn in the period of 1989 to 1991, but has since grown fast. By 1997, the 
total number of workers in the private sector reached 67.9 million.  
The rapid development of the private sector in the 1990s has been a major catalyst for 
SOE reform. A major SOE reform in the 1990swas the privatization of small SOEs. 
Currently, about 80 per cent of firms owned by governments at the county or below 
administrative units have been privatized. By any standard, this is a major 
transformation because it has totally changed China's economic makeup by bringing 
private ownership to the vast majority of firms and workforce in the country (as in any 
other countries, small firms account for the vast majority of firms in China). There is 
no doubt that the records of the private sector’s performance have been a major 
catalyst for this great transformation.  
In 1995, the central government, after several rounds of investigation and discussion, 
formed a policy called "zhuada fangxiao", "keep the large ones and let go the smaller 
ones". The policy allowed the state to focus on 500 to 1000 large state firms and 
allowed smaller firms to be leased or sold out.1 The government had a good reason to 
implement this policy. In 1997, the 500 largest state firms had 37 per cent of the assets 
held by state industrial firms, contributed to 46 per cent of the tax collected from all 
state firms, and to 63 per cent of the total profit in the state sec or. "Control of the 
(500) largest firms means we have a control of the largest chunk of the state 
economy." On the other hand, smaller firms owned by local governments had a worse 
performance than those owned by the central government. In 1995, 24.3 per cent of 
the central firms were in red, but 72.5 per cent of the local firms were in red (Zhao, 
1999).  
                                                       
1 In 1994, as the ministry in charge of the government's economic affairs, the SETC sent a report 
Suggestions on Revitalizing Small State-owned Enterprises to Vice Premier Wu Bangguo who was in 
charge of enterprise reforms. In September, 1995, the policy was formally announced by the central 
committee of the CCP in one of its plenary sessions and was put into the suggestions to the ninth five-
year plan. 
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From the "let go the smaller ones" part of the policy came a word "gaizhi", meaning 
"changing the ownership structure". Starting in 1994, gaizhi began to spread to the 
whole country. The content of gaizhi ncluded contracting and leasing, the two 
methods used before, as well as new methods of selling the firm or transforming it into 
an employee-h ld company or cooperative. Therefore, gaizhi did not nec ssarily imply 
privatization. Yet the government was determined to get rid of the red hat firms. In 
March 1998, it issued a directive requiring all the red hat firms to ‘take off the hat’ or 
show their private ownership by November 1998.  
Not all the localities had been fully prepared for gaizhi. Many firms just changed their 
names, but nothing else substantial. This is particularly true for firms taking up the 
ownership category of employee shareholding. These firms are still regarded as 
collective firms, and local governments still interfere in th ir operations. This is a 
problem in the transformation of local governments' functions. Yao and Zhi (1999) 
have shown that privatization is not sufficient to improve economic efficiency if the 
role of the government is not changed. 
In particular, if the government tolerates its employees' rent-seeking b havior on 
privatized firms, the efforts provided by private entrepreneurs will not reach the social 
optimum. In this regard, the municipal government of Shunde has performed well. In 
the course of its privatization program, the Shunde government undertook a radical 
reform by cutting one third of its employees and 40 per cent of its functional units. 
This reform has served as a signal to the private sector that the government has a 
credible commitment to curbing rent-seeki g behavior as well as micro-level 
interference. To a large extent, the smooth and successful transformation in the city 
should be attributed to government reform. 
Before 1988, private firms with more than 5 people w re not officially acknowledged. 
Private entrepreneurs who wanted to expand their operations to more than 5 people 
had to find a disguise although a few of them dared to ignore the government 
restriction and operated without any disguise. This created many red hat firms that 
were registered as collective, but actually run by private entrepreneurs. This was more 
common in the countryside.  
The success of China's rural industrialization prompted an interest to explore whether 
the combination f private entrepreneurship and collective ownership played a 
significant role in attaining that success. Many authors argued that this combination 
was indeed a contributing factor to the success. Their main argument was that the 
combination was a second best response to China's imperfect market and policy 
environments (Che and Qian, 1998; D. Li, 1994; S. Li, 1997, to name a few).  
While this argument was theoretically sound, that is, the combination of private 
entrepreneurship and public ownership could be one solution to market and policy 
failures, it missed the point that many private entrepreneurs put the red hat on just to 
evade the ideological bias and government regulations (the period of 1989-1991 was
the best example). From the perspective of the local government, in many cases it 
suffered rather than benefited from the presence of a red hat firm.  
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Before 1988, the existence of red hat firms was more a result of the ideological 
restriction and government prohibition than a rational choice made jointly by private 
entrepreneurs and the local government. The influence of ideology was no m re 
obvious then in the period of 1989-19 1 when many private owners transferred their 
factories to collective ownership under pressure of the conservative ideology prevailing 
in that period. After Deng Xiaoping paid his visit to the south in the spring of 1999, 
however, private firms flourished again, showing yet another example of what an 
ideological change could accomplish in China. 
Currently, three kinds of ownership a e defined for private firms by the Chinese laws 
governing firm registration. They are sole ownership, partnership, and a limited liability 
company.2 Owners of the first two kinds of firms take unlimited liability, and the 
owners of the last kind of firms only take limited liability in their firms.  
As a result, the shares of the three kinds of firms changed dramatically. Limited liability 
companies had the smallest share in 1991, but became the predominant form of 
ownership in 1997. A limited liability company offers a firm several advantages 
including protection of personal wealth, a better firm image, and better internal 
governance.  
In terms of registered capital, limited liability companies are the largest, partnership 
firms are the second, and sole ownership firms are the smallest. The sizes of all three 
kinds of firms increased from 1991 to 1994, but from 1994 to 1997, the sizes of 
partnership and sole ownership firms declined significantly while that of limited liability 
firms almost remained unchanged. These trends matched clearly China's 
macroeconomic fluctuations in general and government anti-inflation ry measures in 
particular. 
The size and growth rates of private enterprises vary in different sectors of the 
economy. For example, by the first half of 1999, there are altogether 30,000 private 
firms in primary industry (mainly agriculture) with a growth rate of 20 per cent 
compared with the number at the end of 1998. There are 530,000 firms in secondary 
industry (manufacturing) with a growth rate of about 5 per cent from half a year 
earlier. The majority of private firms are in tertiary industry (services). The number of 
firms in this sector reached 722,000 by June 1999, accounting for about 56 per cent of 
the total number of private firms in China. According to the latest statistics released by 
BICM, private enterprises hired a total of 8.0 million workers, accounting for about 45 
per cent of the total employment in the tertiary industry; their registered capital 
reached 504.8 billion yuan, accounting for about 62 per cent of the total registered 
capital in the same industry. 
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